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Abstract
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ect the R&D decisions
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market. The R&D incentives of 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1 Introduction
Spillover of R&D results is a common phenomenon in industries. Most commonly,
spillover is perceived as a leakage of the R&D results of a rm, voluntarily or involuntarily,
to other rms in the same or other industries. The possibility of knowledge spillovers
aect the R&D decisions of rms. In presence of spillovers, rms tend to underinvest
in R&D (as noted by Katz (1986), d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et.al.
(1992), and Suzumura (1992)). This is why very often rms get involved in race for
patents in order to secure their R&D output. Patent race has been widely studied in R&D
literature (for example, Shapiro (1985), Baye and Hoppe (2003), Baker and Mezetti (2005)
etc.). Another way to address the problem of non-appropriability of R&D knowledge in
presence of spillovers lies in Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). As shown by d'Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), RJV enhances level of R&D investments when spillover rates are
high.
However, it is not always possible to get patent or copyright for innovations. Neither it
is always possible to have RJVs. Under such situations rms decide whether to invest in
R&D depending on what information they have about their rivals' abilities of beneting
from spillovers of their R&D knowledge. This paper makes an attempt to study the R&D
incentives of rms in a duopoly framework under dierent information scenarios where
spillover of R&D knowledge is involuntary and automatic. We term the proportion of the
R&D output that gets spilled over to any rm from its rival rm its spillover parameter.
All rms in our framework are always aware of their own spillover parameters. But a
rm may or may not know the spillover parameter os its rival since the ability to benet
from spillover of knowledge from other sources depends largely on endogenous factors of a
rm and these factors may not be observable to outsiders. Accordingly we may have two
alternative information structures. When every rm knows its own as well as its rival's
spillover parameters, we have a complete information framework. When a rm can only
observe its own spillover parameter, we are in an incomplete information scenario. In case
of incomplete information, thus, the spillover parameters constitute types of the rms.
This paper considers general distribution function of types.
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Impact of spillovers on R&D incentives is quite well looked at in the literature. Rein-
ganum (1981) shows how if \the value of adopting a cost-reducing, capital embodied pro-
cess innovation declines with the number of rms", then the adopting rms are induced
to use newer technologies in a sequence and thus the knowledge gets diused over time.
Grilliches (1992) emphasises the importance of R&D spillovers with supportive empirical
evidence. Mookherjee and Ray (1991) considers the diusion of the latest technology
developed by a dominant rm to competitive fringe rms for both price and quantity
competitions in the product market. In their model, Schumpetrian cycles of innovation
and diusion are observed in the product market when there is price competition in the
product market. Their result shows that the increase in the rate of diusion enhances the
pace of innovation up to a certain pint and has ambiguous eect on R&D incentives for
price competition and the results are reversed for quantity competition. Harho (1991)
elaborates a scenario involving a monopoly supplier of intermediate goods to an oligopoly
industry, where the monopoly supplier deliberately allows spillover of its R&D outputs
which substitutes the R&D eorts of the competing rms in the oligopoly industry. This
leads to an expansion in the output of oligopoly industry thus raising the demand for the
input supplied by the monopoly rm and this is how the monopoly rm benets indirectly
despite the absence of a market for R&D information. De Bondt (1997) explains how
spillover possibilities discourage R&D due to free riding by rivals. However, De Bondt
(1997) also discusses how spillover can create incentives for R&D as R&D eorts by one
rm induces other rms to undertake similar endeavours and thus all of them end up
producing at lower costs leading to lower prices and therefore enhanced demand, which
De Bondt (1997) formally calls \market expansion eect".
R&D incentives are also impacted on by prevailing market structures. De Bondt
(1997) notes that R&D incentives are higher in oligopolistic market structures com-
pared to bot the the extremes of perfect competition and monopoly. Matsumura et.
al. (2013) consider a duopoly industry and nd a no-monotone relationship between
degree of competitiveness and R&D investment. Shibata (2014) extends the work of
Matsumara et.al. (2013) by incorporating the possibility of R&D spillovers. The results
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show that for duopoly markets, non-cooperative R&D is preferred over cooperative R&D
when spillovers are small (less than half), but for large spillovers (i.e. more than half)
cooperative R&D is the more preferred mode.
R&D incentives under incomplete information is a relatively less trodden area. How-
ever, there are a few interesting works. Conti (2014) investigates the role of asymmetric
information in context of RJVs in a duopoly market in presence of spillovers. Conti
(2014) considers a situation where rms are symmetric initially, but they dier in terms
of their R&D abilities leading to inter rm asymmetry after the R&D. Firms may not be
able to observe the R&D ability of its rivals. In the concerned paper there is one sided
private information, i.e. only one rm has private information about its R&D ability. In
a recent work, Frick et.al. (2016) study a duopoly market where rms decide both R&D
investment levels and entry time i.e. when to introduce the new product in the market in
an incomplete information framework. Here, both the rms try to develop a prototype,
and once it is developed, they decide when to to introduce the new product. The rms
dier in terms of their R&D abilities and thus the earliest date at which a prototype can
be created varies across rms. This earliest date is private information to every rm.
Whichever rm succeeds in developing the prototype rst takes away the whole prot.
Observability of the rival's R&D activity plays no role in the decision regarding R&D
investment in this model.
R&D incentives when spillover parameters are private information have not been
explored. This paper makes an attempt to ll this gap in the literature by addressing
this issue in a quite general framework.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the model setup.
sections 3 and 4 elaborate the complete information scenario in absence and presence of
spillover respectively, section 5 elaborates on the incomplete information scenario, section
6 compares the threshold values of the spillover parameter (the types below these values
only invest in R&D) under alternative information structures and section 7 concludes the
paper.
4
2 Model Setup
We consider a Cournot duopoly. The rms are denoted by A and B. The inverse
demand function of the market is given by maxf0; a   Qg, where a > 0 and Q is the
aggregate output produced in the market. Firms have constant and positive marginal
cost denoted by c.
Firms are deciding to invest in a cost reducing R&D. The cost of the R&D is H which
is positive and is assumed to be equal for both the rms. If a rm undertakes the R&D
then her marginal cost becomes c D, where 0 < D < c. We further assume a > c+D.
Suppose rm j invests in R&D but rm i does not; then a part of the R&D will
diused to rm i. The amount of spillover is denoted by di. So the marginal cost of the
rm i after the spillover is c   di. Clearly di 2 [0; D] for all i 2 fA;Bg. We assume
that di is distributed with the distribution function F () and continuous density function
f() and has full support. Therefore, di also denotes the type of rm i and is private
information to rm i in case of incomplete information. It is assumed that rm i knows
its own type, before deciding on the R&D activity.
Some notations: W := a   c, q(x) := W+x
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,  (x) := q2(x) and 	(x) :=
R D
x
y dF (y)
1 F (x)
1.
Note that q0 > 0, 0(x) = 2
3
q(x) > 0, limx!D 	(x) = D2 and 	0(x) > 0 when x 2 (0; D).
Denote `doing research' by R and `no research' by N . Suppose rm A chooses to invest
in research and rm B does not, then we denote prot (expected prot) of the rm A by

[RN ]
A (E
[RN ]
A ) and that of rm B by 
[RN ]
B (E
[RN ]
B ). Similar notation will be used for
other cases.
Our objective is to nd out how the decision of performing the research is dependent
on the type of a rm and the level of information available to it. So it is a two stage
game. In the rst stage each of the rms is deciding whether to invest in research. And
in the second stage they are competing in the after-market.
1The average value of y given that y lies between x and D.
2The intuition is that 	(x) must lie between x and D.
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3 Complete information: No Spillover
If a rm invests in research then her marginal cost is c D, otherwise it is c.
Lemma 3.1. Following holds
 If none of them invests in research then each one has a prot of (0).
 If both of them invest in research then each one has a prot of (D).
 If rm i invests in research and rm j does not then the prot of rm i is (2D)
and the prot of rm j is ( D).
Remark 1. First, note that if the rival is not doing the research then it is always optimal
for rm i to do the research i (2D)  (0)+H, that is, i 4(W+D)D
9
 H. Second, if the
rival rm is doing the research then the rm i will do the research i (D)  ( D)+H,
that is, i 4WD
9
 H.
Lemma 3.2. Following holds
 Both of them will invest in research if 4WD
9
 H.
 None of the will invest in research if (2D)  H.
 Only one of them will invest in research if D2  9H
4
 WD3.
4 Complete Information: With Spillover
We assume in this section that everything is common knowledge, including the types
of the rms. Since we are considering duopoly, at equilibrium three cases can happen:
(1) both the rms invest in R&D, (2) none of the rms invests in R&D and (3) one rm
invests and the other does not. The lemma below summarizes the payos of a rm under
dierent equilibrium situations.
Lemma 4.1. Given two rms i and j, i = A;B, j = A;B and i 6= j,
3The model does not predict which of the rms will invest in research in this scenario.
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a. If both of them have not invested in research then each of them gets

[NN ]
i = 
[NN ]
j = (0)
b. If both of them have invested in research then they both get

[RR]
i = (D) H
c. Suppose rm i does the research and rm j does not, then,

[RN ]
i = (2D   dj) H
and

[RN ]
j = (2dj  D)
Remark. First, note that if the rival is not doing the research then it is always opti-
mal for rm i to do the research i  (2D   dj)  (0) + H, that is i dj  2D   p
W 2 + 9H  W4. Second, if the rival rm is doing the research then the rm i will
do the research i  (D)  (2di  D) +H that is i di 
p
(W D)2+(4WD 9H) (W D)
2
5.
So a rm will denitely invest in research i both her type as well as her rival's type is
\suciently" small.
Note that if H > 4WD
9
then both of the rms will never research simultaneously. In
this case either none of them will invest in research or only one of them will invest in
research6. In particular if H  4(W+D)D
9
then none of them will invest in research.
4The intution is that if the type of the rival is \suciently" small then by doing research the rm
will earn higher prot, since the spillover eect is small.
5The intution is that if the type of the rm is \suciently" small then it is better for the rm to
invest in research, since the spillover eect is small.
6Our model does not predict which one of the rms will invest in research in this particular case.
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5 Incomplete Information
In this section we consider the incomplete information problem, hence we assume
that di is private information to rm i. Note that each rm knows its type before it is
deciding on R&D investment. Since R&D decision is taken at the rst stage, therefore,
at the beginning of the production stage, each rm can observe whether its rival has
performed R&D or not. Suppose  is the threshold value such that a rm will invest in
research if and only if its type is less than or equal to . Given the cost of the research
(i.e. M ), our primary objective in this section is to nd out .
Like the case of complete information we start our analysis by nding out the (ex-
pected) payos of rms under dierent situations. The three lemmas below derive the
(expected) prots.
Lemma 5.1. If both of them have not invested in research then each of them gets

[NN ]
A = 
[NN ]
B = (0)
Lemma 5.2. If both of them have invested in research then they both get

[RR]
i = (D) M
Lemma 5.3. Suppose rm A does the research and rm B does not.

[RN ]
A = (2D  ()) M
and

[RN ]
B = 

3dB +()
2
 D

Proof. The expected prot of rm A is given by
(K +D)qA   q2A   qA
Z D

qB(y)dF (y)
1  F ()
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and that of rm B is
(K + dB) qB   q2B   qBqA
The corresponding reaction functions are
(K +D)  2qA  
Z D

qB(y)dF (y)
1  F () = 0
and
(K + dB)  2qB   qA = 0
Solving the two reaction functions stated above we get
qA = q (2D  ())
and
qB = q

3dB +()
2
 D

The rest of the proof is trivial.
If rm i is doing the research and she does not know whether rm j is doing the
research or not, then her expected prot is
(1  F ())(2D  ()) + F ()(D) M
On the other hand if rm i is not doing the research and she does not know whether rm
j is doing the research or not, then her expected prot is
(1  F ())(0) + F ()

3di +()
2
 D

Let T (x; ) denote the gross opportunity gain from doing research when the type of
the rm is x. Then T (x; ) can be dened as
T (x; ) := (1  F ()) [(2D  ())  (0)] + F ()

(D)  

3x+()
2
 D

9
.Note that T (x; ) is decreasing in x. Also,
T (0; 0) = (2D  (0))  (0)
and with slight abuse of notation let
T (D;D) := lim
x!D
T (x) = 0
So T (0; 0) > T (D;D). Finally,  must satisfy the following equation
T (; ) =M
As stated above our objective is to nd out  as a function of M . However, note that
till now there is nothing that tells us that for a particular M there will be a unique .
The following lemma ensures the uniqueness.
Lemma 5.4. T (x;x) is strictly decreasing in (0; D).
Proof.
9T (x; x) = (1  F (x))[K2 + 2K(2D  (x)) + (2D  (x))2  K2]
+F (x)
"
K2 + 2KD +D2  K2   2K

3x+(x)
2
 D

 

3x+(x)
2
 D
2#
= (1  F (x))[2K(2D  (x)) + (2D  (x))2]
+F (x)
"
2KD +D2   2K

3x+(x)
2
 D

 

3x+(x)
2
 D
2#
= 2K(2D  (x)) + (1  F (x))(2D  (x))2
+F (x)
"
D2 + 2K(x)  2KD   2K

3x+(x)
2
 D

 

3x+(x)
2
 D
2#
= 2KD +D2   F (x)
"
2K

3x+(x)
2
 D

+

3x+(x)
2
 D
2#
+2K(D  (x))(1  F (x)) + (1  F (x))[2D(D  (x)) + (D  (x))2]
Now it can be easily seen that d
dx
9T (x) < 0. This completes the proof.
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Like the case of complete information, the theorem below provides the conditions of
pooling and separating equilibria.
Theorem 5.5. Following hold
 If M  T (D;D) then all the rms will invest in research
 If M  T (0; 0) then no rm will invest in research
 Finally, when T (D;D) < M < T (0; 0), there exists a unique  such that a rm
will invest in research i its type is less than or equal to  when  can be obtained
by solving the equality T (; ) =M . 7
The uniqueness of  given M in the third result is straight from the above lemma.
Since, in the second stage rms are informed about the R&D decision of the rival, this
information acts as a signal. So, it is important now to check the incentive compatibility.
We claim above that a rm will invest in R&D i the type of the rm is less than or
equal to . Suppose rm A follows this strategy and believes rm B to be also following
the same strategy. Firm B knows rms A's strategy and belief.
Remark. Suppose rm B's type is greater than  but it decides to invest in R&D. Here
from the second stage onwards rm A believes that the type of the rm B is less than .
So, rm A will produce accordingly.
So the expected prot of rm B is
(1  F ())(2D  ()) + F ()(D) M
However, if it had not invested, then its expected prot would have been
(1  F ())(0) + F ()

3dB +()
2
 D

From the denition of  and since T (x; ) is strictly decreasing in x, we know that for
7Note that the value of  depends on the value of M .
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all dB >  the following holds:

(1  F ())(0) + F ()

3dB +()
2
 D

> [(1  F ())(2D  ()) + F ()(D) M ]
So, if rm B's type is greater than , then given rm A's strategy and belief, it will
never invest in research.
Remark. Suppose rm B's type is less than or equal to  but it decides not to invest in
R&D. Here from the second stage onwards rm A believes that the type of the rm B is
greater than . So, rm A will produce accordingly.
So the expected prot of rm B is
(1  F ())(0) + F ()

3dB +()
2
 D

However, if it had invested then its expected prot would have been
(1  F ())(2D  ()) + F ()(D) M
Again from the denition of  and since T (x; ) is strictly decreasing in x, we know
that for all dB   the following holds:
[(1  F ())(2D  ()) + F ()(D) M ] 

(1  F ())(0) + F ()

3dB +()
2
 D

So, if rm B's type is less than or equal to  then, given rm A's strategy and belief,
it will always invest in research.
By optimal strategy under incomplete information we mean that the rm will invest
in R&D if and only if the type is less than or equal to  and believes that the rival is
following the same strategy. The above two remarks show that given that the rival is
following the optimal strategy mentioned above, it is always optimal for a rm to follow
the same strategy. So, both the rms following this strategy is a perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
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Below we illustrate our ndings with an example.
Example 5.1. Let us assume a = 10, c = 2, D = 1 and M = 2. Also assume di's are
distributed uniformly. So, K = 8, f(x) = 1, F (x) = x, (x) = 1+x
2
. We have (0) = 64
9
,
(D) = 9, (2di   D) = (7+
7di+1
4 )
2
9
and (2D   di) = (10 
1+di
2 )
2
9
. Firm i is indierent
between investing and not investing in research i
(1  di)
"
10  1 + di
2
2
  64
#
+ di
"
81 

7 +
7di + 1
4
2#
= 18
holds. Therefore,   0:5107. If research cost is more than 2:917 then no rm will invest
in research. On the other hand if there is no research cost then both the rms will always
invest in research.
6 Comparison of Threshold Values
To compare the results under incomplete information to complete information, we
basically need to compare the threshold values under these two situations. It is important
to note that in case of complete information the threshold value depends on the type of
the rival rm, whereas in case of incomplete information it does not. So to compare we
must rst x the type of the rival rm.
Lemma 6.1. If it is optimal for a rm to invest in research in case of incomplete infor-
mation, then she may not invest in research in case of complete information.
Proof. We show this by giving an example. Suppose dis are distributed with the distri-
bution function d2i over the interval [0; 1], i.e. D = 1. Let a = 10 and c = 2, so K = 8.
Let M = 2:3, so   0:4238. Assume dB = 0:9 and dA = 0:41. Clearly, rm A will invest
in research in case of incomplete information. However in case of complete information
irrespective of whether the other rm is investing in research or not rm A will never
invest in research.
Lemma 6.2. If it is optimal for a rm not to invest in research in case of incomplete
information, then she may invest in research in case of complete information.
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Proof. We show this by giving an example. Suppose dis are distributed with the distri-
bution function d2i over the interval [0; 1], i.e. D = 1. Let a = 10 and c = 2, so K = 8.
Let M = 2:43, so   0:3213. Assume dB = () and dA = 0:33. Clearly, rm A will
not invest in research in case of incomplete information. However in case of complete
information irrespective of whether the other rm is investing in research or not rm A
will always invest in research.
The above two lemmas show that whether more information leads to greater proba-
bility of research is ambiguous.
7 Conclusion
This paper considers a two stage game where two rms have to decide whether to
invest in R&D or not in the rst stage and compete in a Cournot duopoly market in the
second stage. If a rm invests in R&D, it experiences lower marginal cost. Even if a rm
does not invest in R&D, it can still experience some reduction in its marginal cost due to
spillover from the R&D of its rival. The spillover parameter of a rm decides how much
spillover benets it can enjoy from its rival's R&D. However, if both the rms invest
in R&D then there is no additional benet due to such spillover of R&D knowledge. In
presence of the type of involuntary and automatic spillover of R&D outputs as considered
here, every rm gets to learn whether its rival has performed R&D when the concerned
rm does not itself conduct R&D. When the rms are aware of each other's spillover
parameters, we are in a complete information framework. However, if no rm can observe
the spillover parameter of its rival, we are in the world of incomplete information. Here
the spillover parameters constitute types and we consider general distribution of types.
Our results show that whether under complete information the rms will invest more
in R&D as compared to the situation of incomplete information, cannot be stated un-
ambiguously. The parametric values for which spillovers encourage R&D investments
support De Bondt's analysis and our result is thus a generalisation of the incentive cre-
ating eects of spillovers in an incomplete information framework.
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Here we have considered success to be a denite outcome of R&D. However, there
might be associated uncertainties that might be incorporated in the framework of the
model. Further research can be done in this direction to identify the conditions for
higher R&D incentives for rms in presence of spillover as well as uncertainties in R&D
under various information structures.
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